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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a commitment to equality expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and a right of access to and control over the government expressed
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in the United States Constitution, the gap between the goal of equality and actual
practice took generations to narrow. In his remarks prepared for the bicentennial
anniversary of the U.S. Constitution, Justice Thurgood Marshall noted:
Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by
the Framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the government
they devised was defective from the start, requiring several
amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain
the system of constitutional government ... we hold as fundamental
today ....
For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we need look
no further than the first three words of the document's preamble: "We
the People." 1
The right to vote-viewed as the central right in a democracl-was not
explicitly guaranteed by the original Constitution, 3 and it certainly was not
universal at the time the Constitution was adopted. 4 As Justice Marshall pointed
out, it was not until 1920 that universal suffrage existed, even in theory. 5
The constitutional commitment to equality was eventually made with the
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, 6 but practical barriers remained,
principally in the form of poll taxes and literacy tests. For example, many states
had enacted a poll tax pursuant to which non-payment would deny the taxpayer
the right to vote. 7 While some states made the political decision to abandon the

I. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and
Trademark Law Association I (May 6, 1987), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_ dlv I/groups/
public/@nyu_law_website_lim jsd_graduate_affairs/documents/ecm_ dlv _ 007197 .pdf[hereinafter
Justice Marshall Remarks].
2. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws .... "); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Kevin Cofsky, Comment, Pruning the Political Thicket: The
Case for Strict Scrutiny of State Ballot Access Restrictions, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 365 (1996)
("[T]he Supreme Court has often recognized the right to vote as the most 'precious' of all rights in a
free society .... ").
3. See ALEXANDER J. BOIT, HANDBOOK OF UNITED STATES ELECTION LAWS AND PRACTICES
I ( 1990) ("Nowhere in the First Amendment is there any reference to the fundamental right to vote or
the right to hold free elections. At the convention, the Founding Fathers could not agree on who
could vote, and as a result the Constitution left the qualifications of voters in federal elections to be
determined by the states."); see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165, 170-71 ( 1874)(holding
that citizenship did not per se confer a right to vote and rejecting a woman's claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment granted her the right to vote).
4. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 5 (2000) ("The lynchpin ofboth colonial
and British suffrage regulations was the restriction of voting to adult men who owned property.").
5. Justice Marshall Remarks, supra note I, at 1-2.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
7. See, e.g., Stone v. Smith, 34 N.E. 521,521 (Mass. 1893).
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poll tax, 8 it was not until the enactment of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment that
poll taxes were barred at the federallevd and until 1966 that the United States
Supreme Court ruled that state poll taxes violated the Equal Protection Clause. 10
Literacy tests were historically seen as guardians of an "independent and
intelligent" election 11 and, as recently as 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously upheld a state literacy test. 12 Further, as late as 1966, three Justices
were still of the view that such tests were constitutionally permissible. 13
Although those deliberate barriers to universal suffrage have fallen, the functional
equivalent of the poll tax and the literacy test is currently emerging, motivated not
by an explicit desire to restrict access to government but, ironically, by quite the
opposite: a desire to make government more accessible and efficient by using the
Internet.
The most recent Supreme Court cases on poll taxes and literacy tests hold that
the government's motivation is irrelevant when fundamental rights such as voting
and government access are involved. 14 However, in the recent voting rights case
of Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 15 the Supreme Court applied a
balancing test-weighing the government's motivation against the impact of its
actions on the right to vote-in upholding a state law that requires photo
identification in order to vote notwithstanding the argument that the burden
deprived some citizens of the right to vote. 16 Crawford only addresses the right to
vote (a right itself not explicitly granted through the text of the Constitution but
rather, arising by constructional interpretation), but the right to vote should be
viewed broadly as a part of a larger set of rights constituting the right to govern.

8. See, e.g., id The Massachusetts constitutional provision at issue in Stone v. Smith originally
contained both a poll tax provision and a literacy test. !d. By the time the case reached the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the tax requirement had been removed from the constitution. Id
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV,§ I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote ... shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or
other tax.").
10. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that "[v]oter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax" and as
such, the poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
II. See Stone, 34 N .E. at 521.
12. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52-54 (1959).
13. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621,622 (1969) (ruling unconstitutional a
property ownership requirement for voting in a school district election). Justices Black, Harlan, and
Stewart dissented, contending that"[ s]o long as the classification is rationally related to a permissible
legislative end, therefore-as are residence, literacy, and age requirements imposed with respect to
voting-there is no denial of equal protection." Id at 637 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
14. !d. at 627-28 (majority opinion); Harper, 383 U.S. at 669-70. For a detailed review of the
history of the demise of the poll tax, see Ackerman & Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution:
The People and the Poll Tax, I 03 Nw. U. L. REv. 63 (2009).
15. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). For a detailed discussion of Crawford, see infra Part V.C.
16. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613-16, 1622-23 (holding that voter identification may be
required-despite posing a barrier for some eligible voters-because it supports a valid governmental
interest in assuring that a voter's identity is valid).
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Viewed as such, Crawford should apply equally to the full panoply of"governing
rights" and therefore has profound implications for the emerging model of
Internet-mediated government-citizen interaction.
Government entities at all levels have embraced the Internet as a vehicle for
government-citizen interaction. The federal government, state governments, and
many local governments use the Internet to provide information and conduct
government business. 17 While this trend has provided unprecedented access for
many Americans, it has also distanced the government from those without an
Internet connection. A 2008 report published by the Federal Communications
Commission found that while 99% of the wealthiest Americans have access to
high-speed Internet service, only 92% of the poorest Americans have such
access 18 and that only 29% of people with a severe disability have Internet access
at home, regardless of economic status. 19 Thus, while the Internet is potentially
the best vehicle for government access and transparency for most citizens, it
simultaneously widens the gap for those citizens without Internet access. This
phenomenon threatens to translate a lack of Internet access into a lack of
government access, ironically posing the greatest threat to two hundred years of
progress toward electoral equality.
This Article begins with a brief history of the right to govern, an explanation of
the statutory barriers that have historically arisen to threaten public participation
in government, and an examination of the arguments raised regarding those
barriers. It then describes the challenges posed by the government's increasing
use of the Internet and the current status, motivation, and direction of web-based
delivery of government services. Next, this Article surveys the available data on
17. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov (last visited Mar. II, 2009)
(providing tax forms and the option to e-file federal tax returns); Maryland State Department of
Assessments and Taxation, http://www.dat.state.md.us (last visited Mar. II, 2009) (providing state
real property assessment data and links for filing assessment appeals); PACER Service Center Home
Page, http://www.pacer.gov (last visited Mar. II, 2009) (providing federal court pleadings and filings
in electronic format); U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Home Page, http://www.uspto.gov (last
visited Mar. II, 2009) (providing a searchable database, published patent applications, and a method
fore-filing patent applications).
18. INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR
INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2007 4 (2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280906AI.pdf [hereinafter FCC INTERNET REPORT].
19. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Americans with Disabilities Act: July 26, at 3 (May 27,
2008), available at http://www/census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/cb08ff-ll.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Census Bureau Press Release]. This group of severely disabled survey participants
had median earnings of $12,800, compared to the national average of $25,000. !d. Those without
home Internet access have other resources available to them, including computer workstations at
public libraries; however, these options may often be inconvenient or inefficient. In 2008, the
Information Institute of Florida State University conducted a national survey of public libraries and
reported that 57.5% of respondents noted that library computers' connectivity speed is insufficient at
least part of the time, and 82.5% reported that they do not have enough computer workstations to
meet demand. JOHN C. BERTOT ET AL., INFORMATION INST., PUBLIC LIBRARIES AND THE INTERNET
2008: STUDY RESULTS AND FINDINGS 12 (2008), available at http://www.ii.fsu.edu/
projectfiles/plinternet/2008/Everything.pdf.
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public access to the Internet, catalogs current requirements of various government
agencies, and measures them against the principles established in the "right to
govern" cases. It concludes that the poll tax cases, while grounded in the right to
vote, are a subset of a broader category of limits on the government's power to
require that its citizens approach the government through a specific mediumlimits arising under the broader First Amendment right to petition the
government. Finally, this Article suggests guidelines for limits on the
government's use of the Internet to communicate with its citizens.
II. THE RIGHT TO GOVERN
The fundamental feature of a democracy is a citizen's right to participate in
government; however, this right does not explicitly appear anywhere in the U.S.
Constitution. Instead, it is guaranteed through the juxtaposition of several
provisions. The right to vote has been described by the Supreme Court as
"preservative of all rights." 20 However, voting is only one component of the right
to participate in government. The right to vote implies the right to know what is
at stake as well as what the government has done in the past and what candidates
propose to do in the future.
Additionally, the right to vote implies the right to know the nature of the status
quo and any proposed changes. The right to participate in government also
includes the right to provide opinions, data, and arguments in general (as
guaranteed by the free speech provision of the First Amendmenf 1) to the
government in order to influence how elected officials exercise their power. The
First Amendment right to petition the government includes both the right to
present requests to the government and the right to ask the government for
information. 22 In fact, it is arguable that at some level, the right to petition the
government is even more important than the right to vote. 23
Yet the Supreme Court has established a hierarchy of protection among the
different constitutional provisions that protect the right of the people to control
their government. The various constitutional standards matter; they result in
different methods by which the government will be permitted to use the Internet
as a tool for interaction with its citizens. It is important to recognize that there is
a right to control the government and that each component of that right must be
protected in order for the right itself to be safeguarded. In particular, increasing
government use of the Internet poses potential violations of the more restrictive
20. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. See id. ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people ... to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.").
23. Certainly, there are levels at which this is not true. For example, if the right to vote was
abolished, the right to petition the government-as currently understood-would be meaningless.
Lobbying and campaign contributions are valuable only ifthere is a campaign in need of funding. In
the absence of campaigning, influencing the government must take another form-bribery, for
example.
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standards of review. For example, the government's interest in economy and
efficiency may explain its decision to make particular use of the Internet and
thereby satisfy a rational basis test, but, when measured against the burden it
places on the fundamental rights of certain citizens, that interest may not be
sufficiently compelling to satisfy the more demanding strict scrutiny standard.
Although a guarantee of the right to vote did not appear in the original
Constitution,24 the Framers contemplated the concept of broad suffrage25 and
found the subject to be controversial. 26 Today, in the context of the right to
govern, the great weight of emphasis has been on the right to vote, which now
holds a special place in the spectrum of rights. 27 Although the right to vote is
crucial, elections are intermittent while government is continuous; thus, citizen
participation in government neither begins nor ends with the casting of a ballot.
Voting is not the only right essential to participation in government: "the
entitlement which is commonly referred to as 'the right to vote' substantively
encompasses numerous distinct liberties which the Court has protected in varying
degrees." 28 Even as to the right to vote, "[n]o bright line separates permissible
election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements."29 The right to
vote is not simply--or solely-a personal right through which the voter may
express his or her views on electoral matters; rather, it is a "right to participate in
24. See BOIT, supra note 3, at I; David Schultz, Less than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter
Fraud and the Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483,
487-88 (2008) ("Initially, the Constitution appears to have left that right up to the states, which
generally limited franchise to white male property owners who were citizens of a certain age and,
occasionally, members of a specific religious faith."). "At the Constitution's founding, '[v]oting was
in no sense a federal constitutional right.' ... [T]he states variously restricted the electorate based on
property, race, religion, and sex." Note, Voter and Officeholder Qualifications, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2230, 2238 (2006) (quoting Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, I 00 MICH. L. REV. 1506,
1512 (2002)).
25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 296 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001) ("The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States.").
26. See Borr, supra note 3, at I ("At the convention the Founding Fathers could not agree on
who could vote .... ").
27. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,433 (1992) ("It is beyond cavil that 'voting is of the
most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.'"); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
I, 17 ( 1964)("No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."). The right to vote is "preservative of other
basic civil and political rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
28. Cofsky, supra note 2, at 365. The liberties that make up the right to vote include: "the
citizen's opportunity to cast a vote, the community's ability to be represented within a larger polity, a
racial group's entitlement to cast an effective and meaningful vote, the candidate's right to be placed
on the ballot, and a constituent's chance to contribute to a particular candidate." /d. Cofsky's list
focuses on rights ancillary to the act of voting; however, government does not stop after its citizens
have cast their ballots. Government is continuous and requires not only participation in the periodic
election process but also the rights to petition and to know what the government is doing. See infra
Part. II.B.
29. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. I, 5 (2006) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 ( 1997)).

2009]

Does Technological Progress Threaten Electoral Equality?

1033

an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the
democratic system."30
Access is critical, both to information about what the elected government is
doing and to the decisionmakers themselves for the purpose of influencing their
decisions. While the right to vote is not expressly stated in the Constitution, the
right to petition the government is. 31 It is tempting to conclude that this fact
indicates that the Founding Fathers considered the right to petition more
important than the right to vote, but the more likely explanation is the Founders'
inability to reach a political consensus on the more volatile of the two issues: who
should be entitled to vote. 32 In order for petitioning efforts to be meaningful, the
petitioners need access to information concerning the government's actions. 33
Finally, the right to be apprised of the government's actions is necessary not only
for effective exercise of the right to petition, but also as an indispensable
counterbalance to, and monitor of, those who exercise the petition right.
While the right to vote,34 the right to petition the government, and the guarantee
of free speech are fundamental components of the right to govern, other less
obvious provisions are also essential. For example, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments help to ensure that a citizen's exercise of the right to participate in
government will not result in reprisals, 35 while the right to a jury trial and the
right to just compensation for taken property help to assure that there will be no
government reprisals for the exercise of other fundamental rights. 36 The right of
access to the courts and the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances find support in the free speech and right to petition clauses of the First
Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 37

30. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441.
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. BOTT, supra note 3, at I ("At the convention the Founding Fathers could not agree on who
could vote, and as a result the Constitution left the qualifications of voters in federal elections to be
determined by the states.").
33. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,597 (1978) ("[T]he courts of this country
recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents."); Pratt & Whitney Can.,
Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 268, 272-73 (1988), a.ff'd, 897 F.2d 539 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("There is a
... common law right of public access to judicial records ... essential to the preservation of our
system of self-government.").
34. Even the right to vote, described by the Supreme Court as fundamental to all rights, is only
guaranteed directly as to federal elections. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966) ("While the right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, §2, of the Constitution ...
the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.").
35. See generally 30 CHARLES ALAN WRJGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6341, at !94 (1997) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause joins with other
provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to make it more difficult to punish 'thought
crimes' or political activism .... ").
36. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VII.
37. Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940,947 (lOth Cir. 1990).
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A meaningful election depends not merely on what happens after the election,
but also what is permitted in advance of the election. 38 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the right to vote is merely one aspect of choosing a representative
government. For example, in Norman v. Reed, the Supreme Court recognized
that in order for the right to vote to be meaningful, candidates must have access to
the ballot. 39 The Norman Court found that an Illinois law requiring third-party
candidates to obtain 25,000 signatures in each district in order to be placed on the
ballot unduly restricted a political party's access to the ballot. 40 Recognizing the
inquiry as "the demonstration of a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to
justify the limitation," the Court concluded that the "severe restriction" was not
justified by a compelling state interest. 41
The right to govern encompasses not only the right to cast a vote, but the right
to know the government's current activities and the right to attempt to influence
its actions. 42 Nevertheless, the great weight of judicial attention is currently
focused on the right to vote. 43 The specific aspect of the right to govern on which
the judiciary focuses has varied over time according to cultural trends. Currently
the hot topic is voting, but during the civil rights movement the more active topic
was the right to petition the government through organized protests, 44 and during
the post-Watergate reform era the more active topic was the right to
information. 45 Each of these topics is required in a participatory democracy; each
right is essential to meaningful participation in government, yet the Supreme
Court has imposed different standards of review for statutory compliance with

The right of access to the courts is basic to our system of government, and it is ... one
of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. This right is one of the privileges
and immunities accorded citizens under article 4 of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is also one aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government
for redress of grievances. . . . [T]he right of access is founded on the [D]ue [P]rocess
[C]lause and guarantees the right to present to a court of law allegations concerning the
violation of constitutional rights.
/d.; see also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 716,
719,728-29 (2003) (discussing the right to petition in conjunction with the Due Process Clause and
free speech doctrines).
38. The 2008 Presidential election convincingly demonstrated the importance of the Internet in
the pre-election aspects of government with respect to fundraising, dissemination of information, and
organizing supporters. See generally AARON SMITH & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN
LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET & THE 2008 ELECTION i-iii (2008), http://pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP_
2008_election.pdf(examining the use of the Internet in the Obama campaign).
39. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992).
40. !d. at 293-94.
41. /d. at 288-289.
42. See Kathryn Abrams, Raising Politics Up: Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 480 (1988).
43. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the judiciary's current focus on the right to vote.
44. See infra Part 1.8.1 (discussing the right to petition).
45. See infra Part 1.8.2 (discussing the right to information).
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each of these provisions. 46 The practical impact of these differing standards may
be seen clearly in government use of the Internet as a method for interacting with
Citizens.
The attraction is obvious-the Internet enables cheap, rapid
communication and dissemination of information around the clock. However,
although the Internet has grown at a dramatic pace, it is not universally
accessible, and inaccessibility correlates with several categories of citizens who
are traditionally viewed as vulnerable. For example, Internet access has been
shown to be less available to groups of citizens who are poor, elderly, or
disabled. 47 Likewise, any attempt to tax access to the Internet would pose First
and Twenty-Fourth Amendment issues. It is therefore important to understand the
reason for the varying standards, to determine which standard applies to
"government by Internet," and to establish parameters within which to
appropriately circumscribe the government's use of this innovative technology.
A. The Right to Choose the Government: Voting

The notion that the right to vote is fundamental to a democracl8 is wellgrounded in the United States' political philosophy. 49 The objective of class-free
suffrage dates back to the original Constitution. In 1788, James Madison
expressed his support for this goal in Federalist No. 57:
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich,
more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of
obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body
of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who

46. Compare Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621,622,633 (1969) (applying
strict scrutiny to overturn a New York statute that restricted voting in school board elections to
property owners in the school district or parents of attending children), with Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 361,369 (1931) (declaring facially invalid and striking down section 403-a of the
California Penal Code, which made it a felony to display a flag or banner as a symbol of opposition to
the government), and Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) (recognizing a
general right to inspect public documents, but noting that the right is not absolute).
4 7. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
48. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) ("In decision after decision, this Court has
made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,670
( 1966) (asserting that "the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental" to be burdened by monetary
obstacles); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens,
we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 3 70 ( 1886) (discussing the right to vote as fundamental to American
jurisprudence); Cofsky, supra note 2, at 365 ("[T]he Supreme Court has often recognized the right to
vote as the most 'precious' of all rights in a free society .... ").
49. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,562 (1964) ("[T]he right to elect legislators in a free
and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.").
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exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch of
the legislature of the State. 50
In 1886, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to vote is "a fundamental
political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." 51 Nearly one hundred
years later, President Ronald Reagan called the right to vote "the crown jewel of
American liberties." 52
Although the right to vote was not explicitly included in the original
Constitution, 53 successive amendments clarified and expanded suffrage. 54
After the Civil War, the nation adopted a series of [C]onstitutional
amendments that addressed the right to vote.
The Fifteenth
Amendment prohibited states from denying the right to vote on account
of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The Seventeenth
Amendment permitted the direct election of United States Senators.
The Nineteenth Amendment enfranchised women. The Twenty-Fourth
Amendment banned poll taxes. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment
directed states to allow qualified citizens who were age eighteen or
older to vote. Yet, none of these amendments affirmatively granted the
right to vote. 55
Commentators have noted the continuing battle between the theoretical expansion
of the voting franchise and practical efforts to limit the exercise of the franchise:
There were repeated periods in American history where efforts were
made to disenfranchise voters .... For example, after the Civil War,
many Southerners used Jim Crow laws, poll taxes, literacy tests, [and]
grandfather laws ... to prevent newly freed slaves from voting.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ... so-called
reforms were instituted to discourage immigrants and urban poor from
voting. In both cases, the pretext for the suppression of voting rights
was the claim of fraud; the efforts resulted in significant drops in voter
turnout. This was America's first great disenfranchisement.
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, (James Madison), supra note 25, at 296.
51. See, e.g., Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
52. Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, I PuB. PAPERS 822 (June
29, 1982) ("[T]he right to vote is the crown jewel of American liberties, and we will not see its luster
diminished.").
53. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 665 ("[T)he right to vote ... in state elections is nowhere expressly
mentioned [in the Constitution)."); see also Schultz, supra note 24, at 487 ("[W]hile the Court has
ruled that voting is a fundamental right protected under the Constitution ... [n]ow here in the United
States Constitution is there an explicit declaration of the right to vote.").
The Constitution confers the right to vote in federal elections, but the qualifications of voters are
determined by state law: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen ...
by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2;
accord id. amend. XVII.
54. See Schultz, supra note 24, at 488.
55. /d.
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A second great disenfranchisement is afoot across the United States
.... This time the tools are not literacy tests, poll taxes, or lynch mobs,
but rather the use of photo IDs when voting. 56
However, by the middle of the nineteenth century, nearly every state had dropped
property ownership qualifications, 57 and today, while "[n]o bright line separates
permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements," 58
most federal election voting qualifications "other than age, residency, and
citizenship are subject to strict scrutiny." 59 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme
Court explained that "since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized."6 Five years later, in Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15, the Court further declared that "statutes distributing the franchise
constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified
discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the
selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative
government. " 61
The government has an obligation to reduce impediments between itself and its
citizens, 62 but even a right as fundamental as voting is not immune to being
burdened. The critical question, explored most recently in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, is the degree to which burdens on the right to vote may
be imposed. 63 Two categories of burdens on the right to vote have been
extensively debated, both legislatively and judicially: literacy tests and poll
taxes. Although both these burdens have been eliminated, the debates provide
guidance on methods of analyzing current technological burdens on citizengovernment interactions.

°

1. Only Smart People Need Apply: Literacy Tests

Literacy tests (tests of some specific body of knowledge or of the ability to read
English) implemented as a precondition to voting were purportedly designed to
56. !d. at 484-85.
57. See KEYSSAR, supra note 4, at xviii.
58. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. I, 5 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,359 (1997)).
59. Voter and Officeholder Qualifications, supra note 24, at 2241.
60. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
61. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
62. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,58-59 (1973)("For even when pursuing a legitimate
interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty .
. . . If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfYing its legitimate interests, it may not choose
a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties."); see also
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (articulating the requirement for states to refrain from
imposing an unnecessary burden on a substantial state interest).
63. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008). For an extended
discussion of Crawford, see infra Part V.C.
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ensure an "independent and intelligent" exercise of the right of suffrage; 64
however, they also had the effect of excluding otherwise qualified voters from
participating in elections. 65 As recently as 1959, the Supreme Court rejected an
equal protection challenge and upheld literacy tests as a precondition to voter
registration. 66 The Court reasoned:
We do not suggest that any standards which a [s]tate desires to adopt
may be required of voters. But there is wide scope for exercise of its
jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, [and] previous criminal
record are obvious examples indicating factors which a [s]tate may take
into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters. The
ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards
designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. Literacy and illiteracy
are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as reports around the world
show. Literacy and intelligence are obviously not synonymous.
Illiterate people may be intelligent voters. Yet in our society where
newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and
debate campaign issues, a [s]tate might conclude that only those who
are literate should exercise the franchise . . . . We do not sit in
judgment on the wisdom of that policy. We cannot say, however, that
it is not an allowable one measured by constitutional standards. 67
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited conditioning the right to vote on
passage of an English examination required of those educated in another language
in Puerto Rico. 68 In 1966, the Supreme Court upheld the Act as a constitutional
exercise of federal power in Katzen bach v. Morgan. 69 In the same year, the Court
64. Stone v. Smith, 34 N.E. 521, 521 (Mass. 1893).
65. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,665-66 (1966) (distinguishing
Lassiter and noting that"[ w]e were speaking there of a state literacy test which we sustained, warning
that the result would be different if a literacy test, fair on its face, were used to discriminate against a
class").
66. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51-53 ( 1959). At the time
Lassiter was decided, nineteen states had a literacy requirement for voting. !d. at 52 n.7.
67. !d. at 51-53 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
68. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (2006); Katzen bach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 643 ( 1966). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides:
[N]o person who has ... successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public school
in, or private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other
than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election
because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English
language.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) (2006).
69. Katzen bach, 384 U.S. at 646-47. The New York Constitution mandated: "[N]o person shall
become entitled to vote ... unless such person is also able ... to read and write 'English."' !d. at 644
n.2. The Court struck down the New York English requirement on the grounds that the Voting Rights
Act was a "proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress by§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and that by force of the Supremacy Clause ... the New York English literacy requirement cannot be
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ruled in Harper v. Virginia Board ofElections that literacy tests, in general, were
unconstitutional. 70
2. Only Rich People Need Apply: Poll Tax and Property Cases

Poll taxes are fees that must be paid as a precondition to the right to vote.
Dating back to colonial times, the taxes were used both to raise revenue and to
limit the right to vote. 71
As recently as 193 7, the Supreme Court upheld poll taxes as constitutional in
Breedlove v. Suttles. 12 The state constitution of Georgia authorized a poll tax of
up to one dollar as a condition of registering to vote, and a statute imposed the tax
on all citizens from age twenty-one through sixty, exempting blind citizens and
females who did not register to vote. 73 The Supreme Court upheld the tax, noting
that poll taxes had a long history of use dating to colonial times. 74 The Court
found that the tax was not levied for the purpose of "denying or abridging" the
right to vote (although it may in some instances have had such an effect) as
evidenced by the fact that the tax applied to aliens who were not entitled to vote
and did not apply to those over sixty years old, even if they voted. 75
In 1964, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment 76 was ratified, providing that "[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote ... shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other
tax." 77 In 1966, the Supreme Court overruled Breedlove in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 18 holding that although the right to vote "is subject to the

enforced to the extent that it is inconsistent with§ 4(e) [of the Voting Rights Act]." !d. at 646-47
(footnotes omitted).
70. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665-66. Although this may be dictum because the challenged Virginia
statute only imposed a tax as a condition to participating in state elections, the broad language in
Harper could be read as holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited restrictions on the right to vote in state or federal elections for reasons not related to
voting; in other words, the right to vote could be conditioned only on "state standards which are not
discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its
constitutional powers, has imposed." !d. at 665 (quoting Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51).
71. See id. at 664 n.l. Poll taxes were usually unrelated to the cost of conducting elections and
were not assessed at the time of polling. !d. (discussing taxes used to fund public schools).
Conditioning the right to vote on payment of the tax was simply a means for providing an incentive to
pay the tax. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
72. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 283-84.
73. !d. at 279-80.
74. !d. at 281.
75. !d. at 282-83.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
77. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 282-83.
78. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). Virginia imposed the tax as a
condition to participating in state elections, even though such taxes were prohibited in federal
elections by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § I; Harper, 383 U.S. at
664 n.l. The Court noted that the Virginia tax was not explicitly protected by the U.S. Constitution,
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imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory and which do not
contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional
powers, has imposed," 79 a provision that conditioned voting on payment of any
fee 80 would violate the Equal Protection Clause81 because wealth has no relation
to one's qualification to vote. 82
Likewise, property ownership cannot be required as a condition to voting. In
1969, the Court in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, considered the
validity of a New York law that limited voting in a school board election to those
people holding property in the school district or having children enrolled in the
district's schools. 83 Although the school district argued that those citizens
owning property in the district (and therefore supporting the schools through
property taxes) and those with children attending the district's schools had the
but concluded that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment still forbade poll taxes
in both state and federal elections. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666-67.
79. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51
(1959)). The Court noted:
We were speaking ... [in Lassiter] of a state literacy test which we sustained, warning that
the result would be different if a literacy test, fair on its face, were used to discriminate
against a class. But the Lassiter case does not govern the result here, because, unlike a poll
tax, the "ability to read and write ... has some relation to standards designed to promote
intelligent use of the ballot."
!d. at 665--66; see also Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups!), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1367--68
(N.D. Ga. 2005) (offering examples of the unconstitutional use of poll taxes to discourage certain
categories of voters).
80. Harper, 383 U.S. at 664. The Court described Virginia's poll tax in a footnote:
Section 173 ofVirginia's Constitution directs the General Assembly to levy an annual poll
tax not exceeding $ 1.50 on every resident of the State [who is] 21 years of age and over
(with exceptions not relevant here). One dollar of the tax is to be used by state officials
"exclusively in aid of the public free schools" and the remainder is to be returned to the
counties for general purposes. Section 18 of the Constitution includes payment of poll
taxes as a precondition for voting.
!d. at 664 n.l.
81. !d. at 665. The Court explained that
[w]hile the right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I,§ 2, of the Constitution,
the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned. . . . [However,] once
the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That is to say, the right of
suffrage "is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory and
which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional
powers, has imposed."
!d. at 665 (citations omitted).
82. !d. at 666, 670 ("We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or
any other tax."). The Court ruled that the "the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental, to be so
burdened or conditioned." !d. at 670; see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974)
(invalidating ballot-access fees imposed on those running for office); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
149 (1972).
83. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
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greatest interest in the decisions of the school board, 84 the Kramer Court found
that the law did not withstand strict scrutiny and held that it unconstitutionally
limited the right to vote. 85 Similarly, in Cipriano v. City of Houma, the Court
considered whether Louisiana could allow only "property taxpayers" to vote in
elections regarding the issuance of revenue bonds by municipal utilities. 86 Noting
that the bonds "are to be paid only from the operations of the utilities," the Court
held it unconstitutional for Louisiana to limit the right to vote in this manner,
because both property and nonproperty taxpayers are "substantially affected by
the utility operations."87
While the Kramer and Cipriano cases may be explained by differences in
statutory interpretation, Harper cannot be reconciled other than by a shift in the
Court's constitutional views. In his article The Contested Right to Vote, Richard
Briffault explains this change in approach:
In the 1960s, the Court changed direction and held voting to be a
fundamental right for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court
invalidated the poll tax; tax payment requirements for voting in
municipal bond issues and school board elections; and durational
residency requirements longer than fifty days. The Court flatly barred
property ownership and tax payment requirements, and indicated it
would look closely and suspiciously at tests justified in terms of
improving the quality of electoral decision-making. The Court also
upheld Congress's authority to ban literacy tests nationwide. 88
B. The Right to Communicate with the Chosen Government

The right to interact with government is a deep-seated democratic right, with
antecedents running from feudal England89 through Colonial America90 and into

84. !d. at 630-31.
85. !d. at 632-33 ("The classifications [at issue] ... permit inclusion of many persons who have,
at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and, on the other hand, exclude others who
have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions.").
86. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702 (1969) (per curiam).
87. !d. at 705--06.
88. Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1506, 1522 (2002)
(footnotes omitted) (reviewing KEYSSAR, supra note 4).
89. See JOHN R. GREEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 126-30 ( 1891 ). On June
15, 1215, a group ofEnglish barons found that a face-to-face meeting, supported by a nation in arms,
was the most effective way of petitioning the government of King John of England to discuss the
Great Charter of England. !d. Today, such a group might find it more convenient to use e-mail or an
Internet chat room to discuss policy. The right to petition was enacted under the reign ofWilliam and
Mary in the Bill of Rights of 1688: "[l]t is the right of the subjects to petition the King." Bill of
Rights, 1688, I W & M 2, c. 2, § I (Eng).
90. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES art. XIII (1765), reprinted in I
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 196-98 ( 1980) (enacted by the Stamp Act
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the explicit language of the U.S. Constitution. 91 The Constitution constrains the
government's ability to limit interaction with its citizens. Not only must the
government (both at the state and federal levels) respect this fundamental right, it
must also provide due process in its interactions with citizens and treat equallysituated citizens equally. 92 On the other hand, there is a legitimate interest in
government efficiency, and, as technological advances have provided new
avenues for efficient government-citizen interaction, governments have acted to
incorporate these technological improvements into day-to-day operations. 93
A citizen's right to deal with the government (which includes, but is not limited
to, the right to vote) has at least two additional components: (I) the right to
inform the government and attempt to influence its actions (referred to as the
"petition right" and explicitly conferred in the First Amendment) 94 and (2) the
right to know what actions the government has decided to take (the "information
right"-not expressed in the text of the Constitution, but implied in "[t]he very
idea of a government, republican in form ... "). 95
1. The Right to Petition
The First Amendment guarantees "the right of the people ... to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."96 In United States v. Cruikshank, the
Court declared: "The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a
right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."97 In fact, "the right to
petition extends to all departments of the Government." 98 The right to petition
must be afforded to the people because "[i]n a representative democracy ...
branches of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make
their wishes known to their representatives." 99
The right to petition is a strong one. In Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the Court upheld the right of a trade
Congress of 1765); PA. CONST. arts. III-IV, VII, XVI (1776), reprinted in V FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 3081-84 (Thorpe ed., 1993).
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. I; id. amend. I.
92. !d. amends. V, XIV.
93. See supra note 17.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
95. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I. In the congressional debates on the proposed First Amendment,
James Madison emphasized the importance of the people's right to "communicate their will" through
direct petitions. I ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (Joseph Gales ed., 1837).
97. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
98. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) ("The same
philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are
both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of
Government."); see also I ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (Joseph Gales ed., 1837).
99. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961 ).

2009]

Does Technological Progress Threaten Electoral Equality?

1043

association to coordinate a campaign to lobby the legislature despite allegations
that the campaign constituted a conspiracy to monopolize the freight business in
violation of the Sherman Act. 100 The complaint described Eastern Railroad's
campaign as being "vicious, corrupt, and fraudulent," because it sought to simply
destroy the relationship between trucking companies and their customers. 101
These allegations did not, however, overcome a more basic concern:
In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of
government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people
to make their wishes known to their representatives . . . . The right of
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we
cannot . . . lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these
freedoms ....
. . . A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people
from taking a public position on matters in which they are financially
interested would ... deprive the government of a valuable source of
information and, at the same time, deprive the people of their right to
petition in the very instances in which that right may be of the most
importance to them. 102
The right to petition extends beyond the right to submit written communications
to the government, and it is the basis of the right to protest or demonstrate. In
Stromberg v. California, the Court struck down a criminal statute prohibiting the
display of
a red flag, banner or badge or any flag, badge, banner, or device of any
color or form whatever in any public place or in any meeting place or
public assembly, or from or on any house, building or window as a
sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an
invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda
that is of a seditious character .... 103
The Court ultimately ruled the statute unconstitutional as covering conduct that
the state could not constitutionally prohibit. 104
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential
to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system. A statute which upon its face, and as
authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the

I 00.
10 I.
102.
103.
104.

!d. at 134-36.
/d. at 129-30.
/d. at 137-140.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,361, 369-70 (1931).
!d.
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punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the
guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. 105
The rights of citizens to access government and to offer input are not unlimited,
and the balance has been difficult to articulate. In Harris v. Huntington, a case
decided by the Supreme Court of Vermont in 1802, the plaintiff brought a libel
action against a defendant who had petitioned the legislature not to reappoint the
plaintiff as a justice of the peace. 106 The court dismissed the complaint, holding
that "the right of petitioning the supreme power" gave the defendant "absolute
and unqualified indemnity from all responsibility." 107 However, in Gray v.
Pentland, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1815 held that "an individual,
who maliciously, wantonly, and without probable cause, asperses the character of
a public officer in a written or printed paper, delivered to those who are invested
with the power of removing him from office, is responsible to the party injured in
damages." 108 Almost 150 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
question and held that petitions to the president that contain intentional and
reckless falsehoods "do not enjoy constitutional protection." 109
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight and
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, the Supreme Court was
asked to determine the scope of the right to petition in the antitrust
context. 110 The Court held that antitrust laws do not extend to a railroad
conspiracy aimed at changing legislative and executive practices. 111 However, in
California Motor Transport, 112 the Court distinguished its holding in Eastern
Railroad:
In the present case, however, the allegations are not that the
conspirators sought "to influence public officials," but that they sought
to bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory
tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process. It is alleged that
petitioners "instituted the proceedings and actions ... with or without
probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases."
Petitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies and
courts to be heard on applications sought by competitive highway
I 05. !d. at 369.
I 06. Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. 129, 129 (Vt. 1802).
107. !d. at 139-40.
108. Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & Rawle 23,25 (Pa. 1815).
109. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479
( 1985) (holding that a letter written to then President-Elect Reagan criticizing potential U.S. Attorney
nominee was protected by the First Amendment but not entitled to absolute immunity from
allegations that it was libelous and defamatory).
110. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1972); E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 134-36 (1961).
Ill. E. R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 134-36.
112. 404 u.s. 508 (1972).
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carriers. That right, as indicated, is part of the right of petition
protected by the First Amendment. Yet that does not necessarily give
them immunity from the antitrust laws.
It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized
from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct which
violates a valid statute. 113

2. The Right to Know What Actions the Government is Taking
With some well-recognized exceptions, 114 participation in government requires
that citizens know what actions the government is taking. The right to this
knowledge stems from the Constitution, statutory enactments, and common
law. 115
The right to petition reaches all departments of the government. 116 In order for
the right to petition to be meaningful, however, the petitioners need access to
information concerning the government's actions. 117 The Supreme Court has said
that "the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents." 118 Further, "[t]his right of access is essential to
the preservation of our system of government. It applies to the judiciary as well
as to the legislative and executive branches of govemment." 119

III. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN EFFICIENCY AND THE INTERNET'S
PROMISE OF INCREASED ACCESS: STRIKING THE BALANCE

The right to participate in government, including the right to vote, is not
immune from burdens and restrictions. The critical question-explored most
recently in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board in the context of state
113. I d. at 511-14 (citation omitted).
114. There are some aspects of governmental authority that are not open to public scrutiny-for
example, matters regarding national security and documents filed in camera with a court. See Black
v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 461, 464 (1991) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
("[T]he right of public access applies to those records of criminal as well as civil adjudicatory
proceedings. All such pleadings, orders, notices, exhibits, and transcripts filed in the [United States]
Claims Court in a civil proceeding are made publicly available through the clerk unless the records
are expressly filed in camera.").
115. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2006); Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 268, 272-73 (1988), aff'd, 897 F.2d
539 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
116. See Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513 (discussing a citizen's right to petition agencies and
courts).
117. Pratt & Whitney, 14 Cl. Ct. at 272-73 ("There is a ... common Jaw right of public access to
judicial records ... essential to the preservation of our system of self-government.").
118. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
119. Black, 24 Cl. Ct. at 464 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Craig
v. Harvey, 331 U.S. 367,374 (1947) ("There is no special prerequisite of the judiciary which enables
it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor
events which transpire in proceedings before it.").
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voter ID requirements 120-is the degree to which the government may impose
burdens in the interest of its own objectives.
Indeed, the right to participate in government is not absolute. 121 As noted in
Burdick v. Takushi, a court evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election
regulation must weigh the asserted injury to the right to vote against the "precise
interests put forward by the [s ]tate as justifications for the burden imposed by its
rule .... " 122 The Supreme Court has also held that every election law, "whether
it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility
of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some
degree-the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for
political ends." 123 Despite the fundamental nature of the right to vote, "to subject
every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest ... would tie the hands of
[s]tates seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently." 124
Further, the fact that a state's system "creates barriers ... tending to limit the field
of candidates from which voters might choose ... does not itself compel close
scrutiny." 125
More generally, when faced with a statute imposing a burden on a fundamental
right, a court must identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the state as
justifications for the imposed burden, and then make the "hard judgment" that our
adversary system demands. 126
As Stephen Gottlieb observed:
The very existence of a government suggests a set of powers and
interests based on the premise that the government must operate
effectively and efficiently .
. . . [N]ot all interests that smooth the workings of government may
be treated as compelling.
The general goal of permitting more efficient and effective operation
of government thus offers only vague support for specific means used
to effectuate it. Indeed, classifying governmental efficiency as a
compelling governmental interest would threaten a wide range of
individual rights, including privacy and associational rights and the

120. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (2008).
121. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,434 (1992) (upholding Hawaii's prohibition on
write-in voting as a "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction[)" despite the fact that it prevented
some voters from participating in elections in a meaningful manner).
122. !d. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
123. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
124. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added).
125. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
126. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789-90.
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right to avoid compulsory self-incrimination. Plainly, the logic has its
limits. 127
The critical question, then, is how to balance the government interest in efficiency
against citizen rights. It is a difficult question-one commentator noted the
confusion among the courts, and the lack of a bright-line test:"[ c]ourts evaluating
Equal Protection challenges to state voter ID laws have varied in the use of
outright strict scrutiny and the Burdick test, often providing little or no direct
insight into their choice of analysis." 128 The appropriate standard to apply is at
issue not only in secondary literature but also within the Supreme Court. Another
commentator, David Schultz, argued that voting cases should be analyzed under
the strict scrutiny test:
The legacy of Classic, Reynolds, and Harper is judicial recognition
of voting as a fundamental right, subject to strict scrutiny. In addition
to these three cases, the Court reached similar conclusions elsewhere.
Collectively, these cases suggest that interference with or regulation of
the fundamental right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny and that
the right may only be limited if a compelling government interest
overrides it. Unfortunately, the Court created some confusion on this
point in Burdick v. Takushi. 129
Schultz noted, however, that the critical case, Burdick, left important questions
unresolved:
The Burdick decision is confusing. While it perhaps looks as if the
Court ruled that all regulations affecting voting need to be examined
from this new flexible and less rigorous standard, the language citations
suggest otherwise. First, in referencing the cases where the Court held
that the right to vote is not absolute, it cited not to cases about voting
rights per se, but to cases involving ballot access and the rights of
political parties .... Second, and more importantly, the Court sowed
seeds of doubt by distinguishing between two different types of voting
regulations-those which impose "severe" versus "reasonable"
burdens. Regulations imposing the former types of burdens would
continue to be examined under the strict scrutiny standard under which
they must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
importance." But for the latter, the new standard would be used "when
a state election law provisiOn imposes only 'reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters .... " Unfortunately, the Court failed to

127. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed
Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917, 962 (1988) (citations omitted).
128. Kelly T. Brewer, Disenfranchise This: State Voter ID Laws and Their Discontents, a
Blueprint for Bringing Successful Equal Protection and Poll Tax Claims, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 191,
216-17 (2007).
129. Schultz, supra note 24, at 490.
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describe what constituted a severe burden versus a reasonable one,
creating confusion about which standard applies to which regulation. 130
Another commentator rationalized the decisions as follows:
Courts considering [Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection]
challenges [to voting regulation] have traditionally applied the strict
scrutiny analysis, requiring that the regulation employ narrowly tailored
means to accomplish a compelling regulatory interest. In more recent
cases, however, courts have not automatically applied strict scrutiny
analysis to all regulations impacting the right to vote, but instead apply
the more flexible Burdick test. Under the Burdick test, a court must
balance the "character and magnitude" of the harm imposed on the
right to vote against the state's reason for enacting the regulation and
the necessity of the regulation. When using the Burdick test, courts
possess discretion to utilize either strict scrutiny or a standard similar to
rational basis to review the challenged regulation, depending on how
"severe" the court determines the imposed harm to be. If the court
determines that the right to vote is severely harmed by a state
regulation, the court will proceed under strict scrutiny analysis.
However, if the court determines that the right to vote is not severely
harmed, it will proceed under a rational basis-like review, requiring
only that the regulation be reasonable to advance an important
regulatory interest. 131
The two views come to the same end: in one, the scope of review varies
depending on the severity of the impact on a fundamental right to govern; in the
other view, the scope of review is strict, but only if it is first determined that the
regulation has a significant impact (otherwise, there is a more flexible scope of
review). 132
130. !d. at 491-92 (citations omitted).
131. Brewer, supra note 128, at 195-96 (citations omitted).
132. Cofsky, supra note 2, at 386--87. "[R]emarkably, the Court utilized a standard of strict
scrutiny in Norman and a balancing test in Burdick in the very same year." /d. at 386; see also
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992) (upholding Hawaii's ban of write-in ballots); Norman
v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 293-95 (1992) (holding unconstitutional an Illinois statute requiring thirdparty candidates to obtain 25,000 signatures per component district in order to be a candidate on the
ballot). Cofsky explained:
In general, the Court would weigh the character and magnitude of the individual interests
asserted against the state objectives. (This is essentially the Anderson balancing test.) The
"rigorousness" of this inquiry however, would depend upon the extent to which the
challenged statute burdened First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Regulations that
impose "severe" restrictions would have to be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest
of compelling importance" (a standard uncannily similar to strict scrutiny), but laws that
subject voters to "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" would generally be held
constitutional. Essentially, the Court created a "balancing test" which was no more than a
veiled tiered scrutiny analysis-"severe restrictions" must be "narrowly drawn" to advance
a compelling state interest (strict scrutiny); but "reasonable" restrictions are presumptively
valid (rational basis).
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ID DEBATE

The conflict between broad governing interests and the impact on certain
groups of citizens recently came into sharp focus in the context of voting.
Responding to concerns over possible voting fraud, a federal commission headed
by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James A. Baker
recommended a carefully crafted system of voter identification set forth in its
report, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections. 133 The report was commissioned
due to a concern over the increasing amount of varying state voter ID laws and
the fact that these "different approaches . . . might prove to be a serious
impediment to voting." 134 More recently, the enactment of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (HA VA) responded to the need for voter identification. 135
HA VA "include[s] a limited identification requirement, applicable only to firsttime voters who registered by mail." 136 Voters comply with the statute by
showing either a valid photo ID or other document, "such as a utility bill, bank
statement, paycheck, or government document" displaying the voter's name and
address.
Balanced against the governmental interest in verifying the identity of voters
(and thereby enhancing confidence in the system which is central to
democracy 137) is the impact on certain voters whose ability to vote may be
burdened, perhaps even to the point of disenfranchisement. Several legislators,
including Speaker Nancy Pelosi and then-Senator Barack Obama have
characterized voter ID requirements as a "modern-day poll tax" and "a poll tax for
the 21st century" respectively. 138
Georgia's attempt to require a photo ID for voting was held to be an
unconstitutional poll tax, 139 although its revised statute was upheld 140 similar to

Cofsky, supra note 2, at 386-87 (citations omitted).
133. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS
18-20 (2005), available at http://www .american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf[hereinafter CarterBaker Report]. The Carter-Baker Commission recommended that states require photo identification
for voters, but that the photo IDs "be easily available and issued free of charge" and that the
requirement be phased in over two federal election cycles, to ease the transition. !d. at 19.
134. !d. at 18.
135. Help America Vote Act of2002 (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2006); see also
Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicia/Intervention in Election Administration,
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065, 1079-81 (2007) (discussing the need for voter identification with respect to
the enactment of HA VA).
136. Tokaji, supra note 135, at I 078 (discussing HA VA § 15483).
137. Carter-Baker Report, supra note 133, at l;seea/so Nixon v. Adm'rofGen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425,453-54 (1977) (recognizing a compelling interest in public confidence in government).
138. 153 CONG. REc. S7059 (daily ed. June 5, 2007) (statement of Sen. Obama); 152 CONG. REc.
H6772 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2006) (statement of Rep. Clay); 152 CONG. REC. H6769 (daily ed. Sept.
20, 2006) (statement of Rep. Pelosi); 152 CONG. REC. H6766 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Millender-McDonald); see also Tokaji, supra note 135, at 1078-79.
139. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups 1), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
140. !d. at 1354-55.
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laws in Arizona 141 and Michigan 142 and the Indiana law that reached the Supreme
Court in Crawford. 143 One commentator concluded that
Although no state has passed such a law, requiring voters to present an
identification card that is available only for a fee paid to the state would
almost certainly constitute a poll tax, violating the Twenty-fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
... even if it includes a provision to waive the fee for individuals who
cannot afford to pay it. 144
Georgia enacted a series of voter ID laws that were challenged in three cases. 145
Initially, Georgia required voters casting ballots in person to obtain a photo ID at
a cost of$20, but also provided the ID free of charge to individuals who signed an
affidavit of indigence, and ultimately the state did not require identification for
absentee voting. 146 Applying the strict scrutiny test established by Burdick, the
district court held that the cost and burden of traveling to obtain an ID was a
severe burden on the right to vote and therefore enjoined enforcement. 147

141. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the requirement for
a photo ID was not a poll tax because it was only indirectly connected to the right to vote).
142. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740
N. W .2d 444 (Mich. 2007). The Michigan law, however, provided that "[i]fthe elector does not have
an official state identification card ... or other generally recognized picture identification card, the
individual shall sign an affidavit to that effect before an election inspector and be allowed to vote."
/d. at 451.
143. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 827-28 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff'd sub
nom., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949,950 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 128 S. Ct.
1610, 1613 (2008).
144. Samuel P. Langholz, Fashioning a Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93
IOWA L. REV. 731, 762 (2008). Langholz noted that the one court that had faced such a statute
concluded that it was a poll tax because it only exempted those who could not pay, not those who
refused to pay. /d. at 762-63 (citing Billups I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70). Langholz further
recognized that because Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections was not based on the
discriminatory effect of poll taxes on the poor or minorities, but rather on the fact that wealth has no
relation to voter qualifications (and thus, its use as a qualification was irrational), "a poll tax is still
unconstitutional even if it is only imposed against those who can pay it .... " /d. at 763 n.I90.
145. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups Ill), 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1382, vacated, 554 F.3d
1340 (II th Cir. 2009) (upholding Georgia's voter ID law); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups II),
439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1351 (enjoining a Georgia voter ID law as imposing an undue burden on the
right to vote); Billups I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (enjoining a Georgia voter ID law as imposing an
undue burden on the right to vote).
146. Billups I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38.
147. /d. at 1362-63. Plaintiffs submitted hundreds of affidavits ofwould-be voters lacking a
photo ID; the affidavits alleged burdens, including physical or mental difficulties, lack of a car or
access to public transportation, living far from the registrar's office, and difficulty accessing the voter
outreach van. Billups II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1312-13; Billups I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-42. The
district court explained the significance of the burden on voters:
Many voters who do not have driver's licenses, passports, or other forms of photographic
identification have no transportation to a DDS service center, have impairments that
preclude them from waiting in often-lengthy lines to obtain licenses, or cannot travel to a
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The Georgia legislature responded in 2006 by making the ID available at no
cost and by launching an education campaign. 148 Partially because of the short
time between the approval of the education campaign and an upcoming election,
the district court again granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement. 149
Following a trial on the merits, and with no election imminent, the district court
ultimately found the Georgia voter ID law constitutiona1. 150 The court noted that
the earlier injunction had "hinged in large part on the fact that many of the voters
who might lack a Photo ID had no real notice of the Photo ID requirement or of
how to get a Photo ID or vote absentee," 151 but that given media attention, and the
government's "exceptional efforts" to educate voters, the plaintiffs would be
"hard-pressed to show that voters in Georgia, in general, are not aware of the
Photo ID requirement." 152 The court found that the requirement to obtain the ID
itself was not a significant burden. 153
Although it was decided under a state constitution that expressly guaranteed a
fundamental right to vote, 154 Weinschenk v. Missouri is instructive in its analysis
and conclusion that photo ID requirements are unconstitutional. 155 The Missouri
Supreme Court acknowledged that "some regulation of the voting process is
necessary to protect the right to vote itself ... and the Missouri Constitution ...
DDS service center during the DDS's hours of operation because the voters cannot take off
time from work.
Billups I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1362. The court also held that requiring indigent voters to sign a poverty
affidavit is unconstitutional because the potential for embarrassment or fear of perjury had a chilling
effect on voting, notwithstanding Georgia's alleged "no questions asked" policy regarding the
affidavits. !d. at 1363-64. Although the state argued that the fee was necessary to offset the
administrative costs of distributing the IDs, the court held that whether it was called a fee or a charge
it was still a cost imposed on the right to vote. !d. at 1339-40, 1369. A similar provision in the
Indiana voter ID law at issue in Rokita was held to be an adequate safeguard for preventing the
disenfranchisement of indigent voters. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 786-87, 823 & n. 70. The Indiana
law permitted indigent voters to vote by provisional ballot without an ID, but only counted the vote if
the voter later signed a poverty affidavit. !d. at 786-87.
148. Billups II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1305, 1351.
149. See id. at 1360. Georgia did not begin to publicize the availability ofthe free ID cards
until approximately two weeks before the July 18, 2006, primary elections. Under those
circumstances, the State has failed to allow sufficient time to educate its voters, and has not
taken into consideration the hardships that requiring voters to obtain a[n] ... ID card
within such a short time frame will place on many of the voters affected ... .
!d. at 1351.
150. Billups III, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1377-78, vacated, 554 F.3d 1340 (lith Cir. 2009).
151. !d. at 1378.
152. !d. at 1378-79.
153. !d. at 1380.
154. Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 221-22 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam). The court
focused on evaluating the right to vote protections under the Missouri Constitution instead of the U.S.
Constitution. !d. at 211-12. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Missouri Constitution provides that
"no power ... shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." Mo.
CONST. art. I,§ 25.
155. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 204.
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specifically delegates to the legislature the right to regulate registration" and held
that a law that would impose only a de minimis burden on the right to vote would
not trigger as high a level of scrutiny as those that imposed a direct and
significant or substantial burden on the right to vote. 156 In deciding which level
of scrutiny to apply, the court found that complying with Missouri's voter ID law
required that a voter "at the very least, expend money to obtain a birth certificate
... [and] substantial planning in advance of an election to preserve [their] right
to vote" and required "time and ability to navigate bureaucracies in order to
vote." 157 Employing a strict scrutiny analysis similar to that used by the federal
district courts in Billups and Crawford, 158 the court found that the right to vote
was a fundamental right in Missouri, that the Missouri voter ID law was not
necessary to accomplish its purported aim of reducing in-person election fraud,
and that the law imposed more than a de minimis burden on the right to vote and
therefore held that the voter ID requirements were unconstitutional. 159
One commentator observed that the Weinschenk decision does not mean that
voter photo ID laws cannot survive:
This is not to say that imposing a Photo ID requirement will always
have the effect of imposing an undue burden on the right to vote, or that
requiring such identification as a prerequisite of having one's vote
counted will always result in an unsatisfactory balance between the
values of access and integrity. It simply means that legislatures need to
ensure that, in implementing these requirements, certain classes of
voters are not left effectively disenfranchised. In Missouri's case, this
might mean a long phase-in period may be required during which forms
of identification other than Photo ID are accepted. A longer phase-in
would give time for the "mobile processing system" included in SB
1014 to reach elderly and disabled voters, and would give all voters
more time to obtain a Photo ID and comply with the identification
requirements, reducing the burden imposed on voters by the Photo ID
requirement. 160
As previously mentioned, a similar statute enacted in Indiana ultimately
brought the voter ID issue to the Supreme Court. Until July 2005, Indiana voters
were required to sign a polling book but were not required to present any form of
156. /d. at 212,215-16.
157. /d. at 213-15. The court found that the process of obtaining all of the documents necessary
to obtain a photo ID was a "cumbersome procedure," noting particularly that evidence in the record
demonstrated that it may take six to eight weeks to obtain a birth certificate, thus some voters without
a photo ID would have to plan far in advance in order to vote. /d. at 214-15.
158. /d. at 215-16,216 n.26; see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610,
1623-24 (2008). The court's "analysis of the voting restrictions under the Missouri Constitution
seems to be substantially similar, if not identical, to that of the federal courts applying the Burdick
test." Evan D. Montgomery, The Missouri Photo-ID Requirement for Voting: Ensuring Both Access
and Integrity, 72 Mo. L. REv. 651, 672-73 (2007).
159. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 211-13,221-22.
160. Montgomery, supra note 158, at 674.
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identification at the polls. 161 In 2005, the Indiana General Assembly enacted a
voter ID law, requiring that voters casting a ballot in person present a
government-issued photo ID. 162 As the Supreme Court explained:
A voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being
photographed may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted only if
she executes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk
within 10 days following the election. A voter who has photo
identification but is unable to present that identification on election day
may file a provisional ballot that will be counted if she brings her photo
identification to the circuit county clerk's office within 10 days. No
photo identification is required in order to register to vote, and the State
offers free photo identification to qualified voters able to establish their
residence and identity. 163
Despite the fact that IDs under the Indiana statute were disbursed free of
charge, certain members of Congress became concerned that voter ID
requirements are, in effect, poll taxes. 164 However, as Langholz points out:
If any regulation that causes voters to incur costs would constitute a
"poll tax," the result would be absurd. For example, voters could
conceivably challenge public-nudity laws because they require voters
to purchase clothing in order to vote.
Similarly, it seems too great a stretch to argue, as Professor Tokaji
does, that a law merely requiring voters to get a free identification card
"imposes a tax on the voters' time." Under such logic, numerous
election administration decisions that increase the length of time a voter
must spend in order to vote-such as moving a voting-site location or
reducing the number of poll workers hired-would rise to the level of
being a "poll tax." 165

161. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949,950 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 128 S.
Ct. 1610 (2008). As Dayna Cunningham points out, "[p]rior to the late nineteenth century there were
no personal voter registration requirements for white men in this country." Dayna L. Cunningham,
Who Are to Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter Registration in the United States, 9
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 370, 373 (1991).
162. Act of Apr. 27,2005, § 2, 2005 Ind. Acts 2005 (codified as amended at IND. CODE ANN.§
3-5-2-40.5, § 3-10-1-7.2 (Lexis Nexis Supp. 2008)).
163. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613-14 (2008) (citing IND. CODE ANN.§§ 3-11.7-5-1,3-11.7-52.5(b)--(c), 9-24-16-10(b) (West Supp. 2007)).
164. 153 CONG. REC. S7059 (daily ed. June 5, 2007) (statement of Sen. Obama); 152 CONG.
REC. H6772 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2006) (statement of Rep. Clay); !52 CONG. REc. H6769 (daily ed.
Sept. 20, 2006) (statement of Rep. Pelosi); 152 CONG. REC. H6766 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Millender-McDonald); see also Tokaji, supra note 135, at 1079-81 (examining
constitutional challenges to voter ID laws as being similar to poll taxes).
165. Langholz, supra note 144, at 764 n.193. Daniel Tokaji argues that even ifiD cards were
free, voters would be forced to take the time to get them, and any imposition on a voter's time is a
cost. Tokaji, supra note 135, at 1080--81.
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However, in Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District oflndiana rejected the argument that secondary costs imposed
by voter ID laws impose an impermissible poll tax as a "dramatic overstatement,"
holding that "election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual
voters. Thus, the imposition of tangential burdens does not transform a regulation
into a poll tax." 166 Such "costs" also result from the requirement that voters
register and vote in person, neither of which would reasonably be construed as a
poll tax. 167 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the photo ID requirement. 168
The dissent contended that the law would make voting "significantly more
difficult" for about four percent of eligible voters, "mostly comprised of people
who are poor, elderly, minorities, disabled, or some combination thereof." 169
Writing for the majority, Judge Posner acknowledged that the law would
discourage some people from voting, 170 but also wrote that "it is exceedingly
difficult to maneuver in today's America without a photo 10," and "the vast
majority of adults have such identification"; and therefore, people who were
discouraged by the photo ID requirement were easily persuaded by "very slight
costs in time or bother." 171 Applying a balancing test, the Seventh Circuit found
the 10 burden was offset by the state's interest in preventing fraud. 172
On April 28, 2008, a divided Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's
holding. 173 The balances drawn in the four separate opinions are instructive on
the question of whether government use of the Internet is an unconstitutional
barrier to citizen access to, and control of, the government.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, begins with the principle
announced in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections that "Virginia could not
condition the right to vote in a state election on the payment of a poll tax of
$1.50" because "a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee
an electoral standard ... [and] [a]lthough the State's justification for the tax was
rational, it was invidious because it was irrelevant to the voter's qualifications." 174

166. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 827 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff'd sub nom.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
168. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954.
169. !d. at 955 (Evans, J., dissenting).
170. !d. at 951 (majority opinion). Judge Posner, however, also remarked that "not a single
plaintiff' would be so discouraged. See id. at 951-52.
171. /d. at951.
172. /d. at 952-54.
173. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008). Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court, which the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined. !d. at
1613. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and A lito, authored a concurring opinion. !d. at 1624
(Scalia, J., concurring).
174. !d. at 1615-16 (plurality opinion).
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Justice Stevens further recounted that in Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court
refused to declare an across-the-board standard:
Rather than applying any "litmus test" that would neatly separate valid
from invalid restrictions, we concluded that a court must identify and
evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule, and then make the "hard judgment" that our
adversary system demands ....
. . . However slight that burden may appear, as Harper demonstrates,
it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests
"sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation." 175
Turning to the pending case, Justice Stevens analyzed Indiana's interest in
deterring and detecting voter fraud and observed that the voter photo IDs
addressed only "in-person voter impersonation at polling places [and that] [t]he
record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any
time in its history." 176 However,
flagrant examples of such fraud in other parts of the country have been
documented ... and that Indiana's own experience with fraudulent
voting in the 2003 Democratic primary for East Chicago Mayorthough perpetrated using absentee ballots and not in-person frauddemonstrate that not only is the risk of voter fraud real but that it could
affect the outcome of a close election. 177
Justice Stevens then analyzed the burden imposed on voters without sufficient
photo identification:
The fact that most voters already possess a valid driver's license, or
some other form of acceptable identification, would not save the statute
under our reasoning in Harper, if the State required voters to pay a tax
or a fee to obtain a new photo identification. But just as other States
provide free voter registration cards, the photo identification cards
issued by Indiana's [Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV)] are also free. 178
Justice Stevens next considered non-monetary burdens:
For most voters who need them, the inconvenience of making a trip to
the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a
photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right
to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens
of voting.
Both evidence in the record and facts of which we may take judicial
notice, however, indicate that a somewhat heavier burden may be
175.
176.
177.
178.

/d. at 1616 (citations omitted).
!d. at 1618-19.
/d.atl619.
!d. at 1620-21.
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placed on a limited number of persons. They include elderly persons
born out-of-state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate;
persons who because of economic or other personal limitations may
find it difficult either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or to
assemble the other required documentation to obtain a state-issued
identification; homeless persons; and persons with a religious objection
to being photographed. If we assume, as the evidence suggests, that
some members of these classes were registered voters when SEA 483
was enacted, the new identification requirement may have imposed a
special burden on their right to vote .
. . . And even assuming that the burden may not be justified as to a
few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to establish
petitioners' right to the relief they seek in this litigation. 179
Ultimately, Justice Stevens concluded:
[O]n the basis of the evidence in the record it is not possible to quantify
either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the
portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully justified.
. . . The record does contain the affidavit of one homeless woman
who has a copy of her birth certificate, but was denied a photo
identification card because she did not have an address. But that single
affidavit gives no indication of how common the problem is.
In sum, on the basis of the record that has been made in this
litigation, we cannot conclude that the statute imposes "excessively
burdensome requirements" on any class of voters.
The state interests identified as justifications for SEA 483 are both
neutral and sufficiently strong to require us to reject petitioners' facial
attack on the statute. The application of the statute to the vast majority
of Indiana voters is amply justified by the valid interest in protecting
"the integrity and reliability of the electoral process." 180
Thus, the plurality opinion suggests that the petitioners simply failed to meet their
burden ofproof. 181 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion viewed the missing proof
179. !d. at 1621.
180. !d. at 1622-24 (citations omitted).
181. See id. at 1622-23. The evidence that the Crawford court found lacking was present in
Billups. Compare id. at 1622 (observing an absence of evidence showing that the photo identification
requirement burdened voters), with Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups II), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294,
1345 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (describing numerous ways in which the lD requirement could burden voters).
In addition, there is aggregate data bearing on the question. For example, the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University found that seven percent of the population lacked "ready access to
citizenship documents," such as passports and birth certificates, that are necessary to vote; that eleven
percent of the population does not have a government-issued 10; and that low-income individuals are
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as irrelevant. 182
To evaluate a law respecting the right to vote-whether it governs
voter qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process-we use
the approach set out in Burdick v. Takushi. This calls for application of
a deferential "important regulatory interests" standard for nonsevere,
nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that
severely restrict the right to vote . . . . Ordinary and widespread
burdens, such as those requiring "nominal effort" of everyone, are not
severe. Burdens are severe if they go beyond the merely inconvenient.
The Indiana photo-identification law is a generally applicable,
nondiscriminatory voting regulation, and our precedents refute the view
that individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the
burden it imposes. 183
Of particular importance to the analysis of the government's use of the Internet,
the Scalia concurrence noted, "[the Court] ha[s] never held that legislatures must
calibrate all election laws, even those totally unrelated to money, for their impacts
on poor voters or must otherwise accornrnodate wealth disparities." 184
In dissent, Justice Souter began by recognizing the fundamental significance of
the right to vote and concluded that the law is unconstitutional because "[t]he
need to travel to a BMV branch will affect voters according to their
circumstances, with the average person probably viewing it as nothing more than
an inconvenience. Poor, old, and disabled voters who do not drive a car,
however, may find the trip prohibitive." 185 Justice Souter also remarked that
"[t]he State's requirements here, that people without cars travel to a motor vehicle
registry and that the poor who fail to do that get to their county seats within I 0
days of every election, likewise translate into unjustified economic burdens
uncomfortably close to the outright$ 1.50 fee we struck down 42 years ago." 186
Also of significance to the analysis of governmental use of the Internet was
less likely to have the requisite identification to vote. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT THE NYU
SCHOOL OF LAW, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS' POSSESSION OF
DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 2-3 (2006), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_39242.pdf[hereinafterBRENNANCENTERFOR
JUSTICE]. For an analysis of the available data and the argument that these data indicate that voter
photo ID laws cannot be sustained under judicial scrutiny, see Schultz, supra note 24, at 501-03.
182. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted) ("The lead opinion
assumes petitioners' premise that the voter-identification law 'may have imposed a special burden on'
some voters, but holds that petitioners have not assembled evidence to show that the special burden is
severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny. That is true enough, but for the sake of clarity and finality
(as well as adherence to precedent), I prefer to decide these cases on the grounds that petitioners'
premise is irrelevant and that the burden at issue is minimal and justified.").
183. !d. at 1624-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. !d. at 1626 n. * (emphasis in original).
185. !d. at 1627, 1629 (Souter, J., dissenting).
186. !d. at 1643.
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Justice Souter's observation that "(t]he travel burdens might, in the future, be
reduced to some extent by Indiana's commendable 'BMV2You' mobile license
branch, which will travel across the State for an average of three days a week, and
provide BMV services (including ID services)." 187
In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer provided the data to support his conclusion
that those affected by the photo lD requirement are likely to be poor, elderly,
disabled, non-drivers or residents in rural areas, 188 and further, "many of these
individuals may be uncertain about how to obtain the underlying
documentation." 189
V.

THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT: THE INTERNET-BASED GOVERNMENT/CITIZEN
INTERACTION MODEL

In one respect, the U.S. federal government of the twenty-first century is
probably the most universally accessible government in history. At the
theoretical level, the right to effective participation in government is guaranteed
by the right to vote, the right to free speech, the right to petition the government,
and the Fourteenth Amendment; these rights are implemented through
information-access legislation. 190 At the practical level, every citizen over the age

187. /d. at 1630 n.l4.
188. /d. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer remarked:
[A]n Indiana nondriver, most likely to be poor, elderly, or disabled, will find it difficult and
expensive to travel to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, particularly if he or she resides in one
of the many Indiana counties lacking a public transportation system .... [O]ut oflndiana's
92 counties, 21 have no public transportation system at all and 32 others restrict public
transportation to regional county service. Many of these individuals may be uncertain
about how to obtain the underlying documentation, usually a passport or a birth certificate,
upon which the statute insists. And some may find the costs associated with these
documents unduly burdensome (up to $ 12 for a copy of a birth certificate; up to $ I 00 for
a passport). By way of comparison, this Court previously found unconstitutionally
burdensome a poll tax of $ 1.50 (less than $ I 0 today, inflation-adjusted). Further,
Indiana's exception for voters who cannot afford this cost imposes its own burden: a
postelection trip to the county clerk or county election board to sign an indigency affidavit

after each election.
/d. (citations omitted).
189. /d.
190. See, e.g., Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l )--(2) (2006) ("(I) Each
agency shall ... publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public--(A) descriptions of its
central and field organization and the established places at which, ... the public may obtain
information, make submittals or requests, or obtain decisions; ... (B) statements of the general course
and method by which its functions are channeled and determined ... ; (C) rules of procedure .... (2)
Each agency, ... shall make available for public inspection and copying--(A) final opinions ... (B)
. . . statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency ... (C)
administrative staff manuals .... ");see also National Freedom of Information Coalition, State FOI
Laws, http://www.nfoic.org/state-foi-laws (last visited Mar. 12, 2009) (providing links to freedom of
information laws in all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
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of eighteen 191 may register and vote with fairly little effort. 192 Federal law even
requires that a state driver's license application form may simultaneously "serve
as an application for voter registration" in federal elections. 193 Theoretical access
to information from the government is not even limited to individuals who are
citizens; 194 in actuality, unprecedented access is made possible through the
Internet.
Nevertheless, a problem remains in the form of disparity in citizens' access to
the Internet. As government moves toward greater reliance on the Internet as its
preferred medium of government-citizen interactions, disparity in access to the
Internet translates into disparity in access to government information and services,
which translates into disparity in participation in government.
The extent of the problem, and whether it is constitutionally tolerable, depends
on several factors:
l. The manner in which the government uses the Internet;
2. The cost to the citizen (including government fees and inherent
costs);
3. The degree and distribution of Internet accessibility;
4. The availability of alternatives to distributing the information;
5. The duration of the disparity and efforts to mitigate disparity; and
6. The potential benefits to governing.

A. Types ofGovernment Uses
Governments use the Internet in several ways:

191. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV,§ 2; XXVI. However, the right to vote may be forfeited. The
Fourteenth Amendment reduced state representation if states denied voting rights to citizens except if
those citizens participated in "rebellion, or other crime." /d. amend. XIV,§ 2; see also Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding a California law that denied convicted and subsequently
released felons the right to vote); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,345-46 (1890) (listing restrictions,
some now historical, on the right to vote). Such laws were widespread: "[E]Ieven state constitutions
adopted between 1776 and 1821 prohibited or authorized the legislature to prohibit exercise of the
franchise by convicted felons. Moreover, twenty-nine states had such provisions when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, and the total has now risen to forty-two." Green v. Bd. of Elections of
N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 450 (1967); see also One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon
Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1942 (2002) (citations omitted) (considering that
"[t]he nation seems to be nearing a consensus that the presently incarcerated should not have the right
to vote").
192. Contra Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1631 (Souter, 1., dissenting) (arguing that there are classes of
citizens for whom this is not so, including "the poor, the old, and the immobile"). See also supra text
accompanying notes 185-87.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3(a)(l) (2006).
194. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006) ("Each agency shall make available [federal records] to the
public .. .. "(emphasis added)).
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I. Providing information online that was previously available in printed
form;l9s
2. Providing information online that is either unavailable in printed form or is
qualitatively different from that available in printed form; 196
3. Providing information online which will eventually 197 be made available in
printed form, but which is more timely online; 198
4. Offering the option of submitting required information online or on paper; 199
5. Mandating that certain required information 200 be submitted online; and
6. Offering the choice of submitting required information online or on paper,

195. See, e.g., District of Columbia Mail-In Voter Registration Form, available at
http://www.dcboee.org/pdf_files/Mail_VRForm_HA VA2003.pdf; Maryland Voter Registration
Application, available at http://www.elections.state.md.us/pdf/2007 _English_InternetVRA.pdf;
Virginia Voter Registration Application Form, available at http://www.sbe.virginia.gov/cms/
documentsN oterRegistration/sbe_voter_app _DOJ-Printed.pdf.
196. Electronic Government-Opportunities and Challenges Facing the FirstGov Web Gateway:
Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Government Management, Information, & Technology ofH.
Comm. on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) (statement of David L. McClure, Director,
Information Technology Management Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/
dOl 0087t.pdf[hereinafter McClure Statement] (discussing the advantages of the web portal entitled
FirstGov.gov). An example of online information that is substantially different than its printed
version is data in a database that is available as a printed table. Providing the same data online
electronically in the form of a database allows the user to organize the same data in multiple ways.
The same data is made available in both cases, but the database allows the user to use the data more
efficiently.
197. "Eventually" may refer to a delay of only a few hours or days, but still may make a
substantial difference in data quality. For example, there is a qualitative difference between the stock
price quotations printed daily in the paper and real-time online prices. See Stock Market
lnvestors.com, Newspaper and Online Stock Quotes, http://www.stock-market-investors.com/stockinvesting-basics/newspaper-and-online-stock-quotes.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2009) ("The Internet
provides investors with the opportunity to observe quote changes in real time. So, the Internet differs
from newspapers by its dynamic nature. The newspapers give you just a report on the changes that
have occurred the previous day, whereas the Internet allows you to actually observe these changes
[almost immediately after they happen].").
198. See McClure Statement, supra note 196, at 3 ("[FirstGov] is generally intended to provide
citizens with broad access to federal information and services in an organized and efficient manner.").
199. Memorandum on the Use oflnformation Technology, 2 PUB. PAPERS. 2317 (Dec. 17, 1999)
[hereinafter Clinton Memorandum] (requiring the heads of all agencies to post online the "forms
needed for the top 500 Government services used by the public").
200. Examples of required information range from those absolutely required (for example, tax
returns) to those required only in order to obtain some benefit (for example, voter registration or
driver licenses). Ironically, some U.S. Bankruptcy Courts require that petitions be filed
electronically. United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California, Electronic Filing
Requirements, http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/procedures/sr/jaroslovsky/electronic-filing-requirements
(last visited July 5, 2009). Although the rule permits exceptions, "[!]eave to deviate from the ...
requirements may be granted only by the Judge upon application with [the] proposed order e-mailed
in .wpd or .doc format .... Lack ofcomputer equipment [or] computer illiteracy . .. will generally
not be valid excuses." /d. (emphasis added).
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but offering an incentive for online submission. 201
It should be obvious that each of these uses of the Internet poses different
challenges to the goal of providing constitutionally required access to the
government. There is a spectrum of governmental Internet use ranging from
offering the type of convenience202 that the majority in Crawford found
unobjectionable, on one end, to requiring citizens to only use the Internet in order
to obtain government information, on the other. Between the two ends of the
spectrum lie situations where some incentive is offered for use of the Internet. 203
Within the middle of this spectrum are incentives that can be justified by
differentials in the government's cost of providing the service204 and other
incentives that are designed purely to encourage Internet use? 05
Conceptually, the uses may be categorized as follows: (1) additional
alternatives-providing the same services over the Internet in addition to
traditional means; (2) near alternatives-providing similar services over the
Internet and by traditional means (but with Internet delivery having advantages
that are either deliberately designed or incidental); and (3) substitutionproviding services over the Internet and discontinuing traditional methods of
providing those services.
Note that an analysis of the government's use of the Internet implicates the
issues posed by both poll taxes and literacy tests: effective use of the Internet
involves both the cost of access and knowledge of how to use it. Thus, a subtle
barrier is developing as a result of the government agencies' shift to web-based
delivery of services. This barrier excludes or limits participation by those without
Internet access and, in effect, imposes a twenty-first century version of the poll
tax and literacy tests_2°6

201. See, e.g., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, FY 2009 Fee Schedule (Mar. I, 2009),
http://www .uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2009january0 I_2009jan 12.htm#patapp [hereinafter
Patent and Trademark Office, FY 2009 Fee Schedule] (listing lower trademark processing fees if the
registration application is submitted electronically).
202. Examples of convenience-type benefits include more rapid access (online access rather than
waiting for a document to arrive in the mail) and savings on postage (by requesting a document online
rather than mailing a request). See Clinton Memorandum, supra note 199, at 2642 (requesting agency
heads to promote e-commerce and provide access to officials via e-mail).
203. For example, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office offers discounts fore-filing patent and
trademark applications. Patent and Trademark Office, FY 2009 Fee Schedule, supra note 201.
204. See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 592, 598 (1942) (finding that a city may impose
reasonable commercial licensing fees); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941)
(upholding a New Hampshire statute mandating a sliding-scale licensing fee for public-street
parades); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 593 (1939) ("It is no longer open to question that the
states have constitutional authority to exact reasonable fees for the use of their highways by vehicles
moving interstate." (citations omitted)).
205. See Obama Administration's Technology Agenda, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/
technology/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (pledging to use tax and loan incentives to ensure nationwide
broadband access).
206. See supra note 138.
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B. The Current State ofInternet Access

The great majority of Americans have access to the Internet, either at home or
at work, and Internet penetration is proceeding at a rapid pace. The most recent
report of the Federal Communications Commission Wire line Competition Bureau
states that high-speed Internet lines have increased from 65.3 million as of June
30, 2006 to 100.9 million as of June 30, 2007-an increase of 55%. 207 Of the
100.9 million lines, 65.9 million were "designed to serve primarily residential end
users." 208 Nationwide, high-speed DSL connections were available to 82% of
households with local telephone service, and high-speed cable modem Internet
service was available to 96% of households with television cable service. 209
However, access is not uniformly distributed, either geographicall/ 10 or
sociologically. As noted previously, the statistics are telling: while 99% of the
wealthiest households have access to high-speed Internet service, only 92% of the
poorest households have such access. 211 Overall, 51% of Americans have Internet
access at home 212 but only 29% of people with a severe disability have Internet
access at home? 13
It may be argued, along the lines of the Crawford decision, that this disparity is
both a benign result of other factors and a tolerable outcome because those
without home Internet access have other resources available-for example,
computers at local public libraries. 214 However, two problems remain. Merely
providing access is only part of the solution; a user must still have some level of
familiarity with the Internet. Fewer than 22% of public libraries offer assistance
in accessing government documents online, and less than half offer any kind of
Internet training in general. 215 In addition to the inconvenience and expense of
207. FCC INTERNET REPORT, supra note 18, at I.
208. ld. at 3.
209. Jd. Comparing Internet service with telephone service as of March 2007, nationwide
penetration of telephone service was 94.6% of the U.S. population, while only 88.4% oflow-income
households had telephone service. ALEXANDER BELINFANTE, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N,
TELEPHONE PENETRATION BY INCOME BY STATE I (2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280981 A !.pdf.
210. See FCC INTERNET REPORT,supra note 18, at tbl14. High speed DSL availability ranged
from below 70% in the following states: New Hampshire (61 %), Vermont (66%), Virginia (66%), and
Maine (68%); high speed DSL availability ranged to 90% or more in Georgia (91 %) and Nevada
(90%). Jd.
211. Id. at 4.
212. I d. This same group of disabled persons had median earnings of$12,800 as compared with
the national average of$25,000. Jd.
213. U.S. Census Bureau Press Release, supra note 19, at 3.
214. BERTOT, supra note 19, at II. The Information Institute reported that "98.9 percent of
public library branches offer public Internet[;]72.5 percent oflibrary branches report that they are the
only provider of free public Internet access in their communities." ld.
215. JOHN C. BERTOT ET AL., INFO. USE MGMT. & POL'Y lNST., PUBLIC LIBRARIES AND THE
INTERNET 2006: STUDY RESULTS AND FINDINGS 17,45 (2006), available at http://www.ii.fsu.edu/
projectfiles/plinternet/2006/2006_plinternet.pdf[hereinafter 2006 BERTOT REPORT]. About one-third
of Massachusetts public libraries offer Internet training. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. BD. OF
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reaching these resources, a 2008 Infonnation Institute study found that 57.5% of
respondent libraries reported that their connectivity speed is insufficient at least
part of the time, and 82.5% reported that they have insufficient workstation
availability some or all of the time. 216 For users with time-sensitive needs, the
problem with depending on libraries for Internet access should be obvious. The
current data on Internet access therefore indicate that differential access disfavors
groups that are traditionally vulnerable-such as the poor, the elderly, and the
disabled-but not necessarily entitled to special protection. 217
C. The Consequences of Differential Impact: The Crawford Debate

The conclusion that Jaws have different impacts on different people cannot be
avoided--different groups of people have different resources. In certain cases,
the nature of a particular Jaw may require that the government take steps to
mitigate these different impacts. For example, in Griffin v. Illinois, convicted
felons who were unable to pay for trial transcripts necessary for filing an appeal
requested that the state furnish free transcripts. 218 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court held that the state must provide the free transcripts, noting:
Surely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal
Government could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to
pay court costs in advance should be denied the right to plead not guilty
or to defend themselves in court . . . . In criminal trials a State can no
more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion,
race, or color.
... There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be
afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts. 219
However, the dissent contended:

LIBRARY COMM'RS, MASSACHUSETIS PUBLIC LIBRARY DATA: ELECTRONIC SERVICES I (2007),
available at http://mblc.state.ma.us/advisory/statistics/public/repelec/elec_sum. pdf.
216. BERTOT, supra note 19, at 12.
217. Laws that disadvantage certain classes of citizens are viewed with greater suspicion.
Examples of classes that have been given heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause are
those based on race, gender, and alienage. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,532-34
(1996) (applying heightened/intermediate level of scrutiny to VMI's gender-discriminatory policy);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 n.9 (1969) ("[W]e have long held that if
the basis of classification is inherently suspect, such as race, the statute must be subjected to an
exacting scrutiny .... "); cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,470 (1991) (reiterating that age is not
a suspect classification); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442--43 (1985) (noting
that mental retardation is not subject to a higher standard of scrutiny); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
322-23 (1980) ("[P]overty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.").
218. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
219. !d. at 17, 19.
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[C]ertainly Illinois does not deny equal protection to convicted
defendants when the terms of appeal are open to all, although some
may not be able to avail themselves of the full appeal because of their
poverty. Illinois is not bound to make the defendants economically
equal before its bar of justice. For a State to do so may be a desirable
social policy, but what may be a good legislative policy for a State is
not necessarily required by the Constitution of the United States.
Persons charged with crimes stand before the law with varying degrees
of economic and social advantage. Some can afford better lawyers and
better investigations of their cases. Some can afford bail, some cannot.
The Constitution requires the equal protection of the law, but it does
not require the States to provide equal financial means for all
defendants to avail themselves of such laws. 220
This prompted the majority to reply, "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be
grossly discriminatory in its operation."221
The Supreme Court extended this trend in Bounds v. Smith to require states to
provide additional resources to assure that criminal defendants had access to
resources necessary for a defense? 22 The Court held that "the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained
in the law." 223
In Lewis v. Casey, the Court stated that Bounds requires a showing of "actual
injury" and a "nonfrivolous" underlying claim-for example, a demonstration
"that the alleged shortcomings in the prison library or legal assistance program
hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim."224 As noted previously, in his
concurring opinion in Crawford, Justice Scalia noted that courts cannot "require[]
exceptions for vulnerable voters" as such practice "would effectively turn back
decades of equal-protection jurisdiction."225
While the facts of Crawford are limited to voting, its implications are far
broader. Construed most generally, Crawford deals with the tension between
citizen interests and government interests. Those who characterize the voter ID
requirement as a form of poll tax take the argument part of the way. At its most
general interpretation, Crawford poses the question of what burdens may be
placed on some in order that the government may function "better" for most,
whether "better" means more reliably, more transparently, or more efficiently.
220. /d. at 28-29 (Burton, J., and Minton, J., dissenting).
221. /d. at 17 n.ll (majority opinion).
222. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977).
223. /d. at 828.
224. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,351-53 (1996).
225. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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Although a majority of the Court considered the issue of the validity of
Indiana's photo ID law and concluded that, under the evidence available on
appeal, the theoretical inconvenience of a hypothetical few did not overcome a
governmental interest in confidence in the system of government, 226 there is a
second majority in Crawford. The lead opinion and the two dissenting opinions
can be interpreted as agreeing on the issue of balancing and only disagreeing on
whether the petitioners sustained the burden of proving impact. 227 In evaluating
constraints on governmental use of the Internet, it is helpful to consider how
Crawford might have been decided had there been proof of the facts which the
dissents considered dispositive.
The factors that the Crawford dissenters found compelling and the lead opinion
found not proven included:
(1) Government Fees: All justices agreed that Harper was still good law; had
the state imposed even a minor direct fee 228 for the privilege of voting it would
have been an invidious, even if rational, unconstitutional poll tax. 229 The lead
opinion and dissents also appear to be in agreement that charging a fee for the
photo ID would likewise have been an unconstitutional, although indirect, 230
charge. 231
(2) Non-monetary Burdens: The lead opinion and the dissents acknowledged
that some (undefined in the view of the lead opinion) citizens faced special
burdens in complying with the photo ID requirement:
For most voters who need them, the inconvenience of making a trip to
the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a
photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right
to vote ....

226. !d. at 1623-24 (plurality opinion).
227. See id. at 1622-23; id. at 1627, 1632 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1643-44 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
[O]n the basis of the evidence in the record it is not possible to quantify either the
magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the portion of the burden
imposed on them that is fully justified.
In sum, on the basis of the record ... we cannot conclude that the statute imposes
"excessively burdensome requirements .... "
... The application of the statute to the vast majority oflndiana voters is amply justified
by the valid interest in protecting "the integrity and reliability of the electoral process."
!d. at 1622-24 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
228. The fee struck down in Harper was $1.50, a sum that the Breyer dissent calculated as
equivalent to less than $10 in current monetary value. !d. at 1644 (Breyer, J ., dissenting).
229. See id. at 1615-16 (plurality opinion). The fee would be invidious because the ability to pay
is not relevant to one's qualification to vote. !d.
230. The charge would not be for the privilege of voting, but rather for an ID card which, in tum,
was required in order to vote. !d. at 1620-21.
231. See id. at 1620-21; id. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Both evidence in the record and facts of which we may take judicial
notice, however, indicate that a somewhat heavier burden may be
placed on a limited number of persons. They include elderly persons
born out-of-state, . . . persons who because of economic or other
personal limitations may find it difficult either to secure a copy of their
birth certificate or to assemble the other required documentation ...
homeless persons; and persons with a religious objection to being
photographed. 232
A plurality of the Court found the evidence insufficient to establish the level of
incidence of these burdens. 233
(3) State interest: All agreed that there was a state interest in maintaining
confidence in the system of government although the stated specific objective of
deterring and detecting voter fraud was unsupported by any evidence of the type
of fraud that a photo ID might deter or detect. 234
VI. CONCLUSION
A. The Internet and Crawford Compared
The State Interest: In Crawford, the Court found a governmental interest in the
general integrity of the governing system, despite the fact that the specific remedy
did not match an ill for which there was any evidence. 235 The Internet as a
medium for government/citizen interaction offers general advantages of
efficiency and the potential for greater transparency and access. There is little
room to argue that no valid government interest exists in using the Internet as the
vehicle, or even the preferred vehicle, for government-citizen interactions.
Government fees: In Crawford (and the other voter 10 cases that were upheld
at the circuit court level) the government did not impose a direct charge for the
necessary government-issued photo I0?36 Likewise, the government does not
impose a direct charge for Internet access. 237 The current political climate does
not seem conducive to efforts to tax Internet access. Of the state legislatures that
have considered the question, most have introduced bills to prohibit taxation of
Internet access. 238 At the federal level, Congress has consistently favored

232. /d. at 1621 (plurality opinion).
233. !d. at 1622-23.
234. See id. at 1617-18. Justice Stevens ultimately concluded: "The application of the statute to
the vast majority of Indiana voters is amply justified by the valid interest in protecting the integrity
and reliability of the electoral process." /d. at 1624.
235. !d. at 1623.
236. /d. at 1621.
237. See, e.g., Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act of2009, H.R. 1560, I lith Cong. (2009)
(attempting "to make the moratorium on Internet access taxes ... permanent").
238. Various states have either passed or introduced legislation prohibiting the taxation of
Internet access. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT.§ 24-79-102 (2009) (passing legislation prohibiting
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exempting Internet access and transactions from state taxation. 239 Congress's
rationale appears to rest on the Commerce Clause and the belief that state taxation
on Internet transactions would impede interstate commerce.Z40 Nevertheless,
cash-strapped states looking for new sources of revenue may be tempted to
consider the Internet, 241 and the federal government itself might be tempted to tap
such a large and growing source.
If the underlying theory of the objection to taxation oflnternet access is that
such taxation places an unacceptable burden on interstate commerce, then
whether to allow such taxation or not is entirely within the discretion of Congress.
Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce242 but has no obligation
to do so in any particular way. However, an additional objection to taxing
Internet access is that such taxation imposes a burden on the right of access to the
government, and Congress does not have the discretion to permit such a burden.
Any future decision to tax Internet access would need to be crafted with this
objection in mind, and under Harper and Crawford, it is hard to see how any such
tax, however small, could be found constitutional.
Non-monetary Burdens: At the time Crawford was decided, there were groups
that (whether the proof was of record or not) clearly faced greater burdens than
most in complying with the voter ID requirement. The Brennan Center for Justice
found that 7% of the population lacked ready access to citizenship-type papers,
such as passports and birth certificates that are necessary to vote, 243 that 11% of
the population did not have a government-issued ID, and that low-income
individuals were less likely to have the requisite identification to vote.Z 44 Current
taxation oflnternet access); S. 901, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (introducing legislation
prohibiting the taxation oflntemet access).
239. S. 1525, I 07th Cong. (200 I) (proposing to extend the moratorium on taxation of Internet
access for five additional years).
240. H.R. REP. No. I 05-808, pt. I, at I (1998) ("The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 3529) to establish a national policy against State and local interference with
interstate commerce on the Internet or online services, and to excise congressional jurisdiction over
interstate commerce by establishing a moratorium on the imposition of exactions that would interfere
with the free flow of commerce via the Internet, and for other purposes, having considered the same,
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.").
241. At least one state, Texas, has already begun taxing Internet access. See TEX. TAX CODE§
151.325 (2006) (permitting the collection of taxes on the amount of monthly Internet access fees that
exceeds $25.00). Texas is permitted to tax Internet access even in light of the prohibition of the
Internet Tax Freedom Act, because Texas was already taxing such access before the enactment of the
Internet Tax Freedom Act. See generally Michael Mazerov, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities,
Renewing the "Internet Tax Freedom Act" Could Have an Especially Adverse Impact on Kentucky,
Michigan, Ohio & Texas 1-3 (2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-26-07sfp.pdf
(identifYing the adverse effects the Internet Tax Freedom Act will have on the tax regimes of
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas).
242. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557,573 (1886) (stating that the Commerce
Clause gives "[C]ongress the power to regulate commerce among the states, and with foreign nations
....").
243. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 181, at 2.
244. !d. at 2-3.
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Internet data presents a similar picture. While a smaller percentage of the overall
population lacks Internet access, there is still a significant disparity based on
wealth 245 and disability. 246
Rearranging the alignment of the Crawford opinions on the assumption that
adequate proof would be available, these non-monetary burdens would be enough
to constrain the government's use of the Internet. The constraints, however, need
be neither insurmountable nor permanent.

B. Outgrowing the Problem
Crawford arises because of technological progress, admittedly based on a
technology that has been available for a century. The delay between the
availability of photographic technology and its use in personal identification, and
the further delay in its use to verify a voter's identity may be an important factor.
It is not difficult to imagine that a century from now, it will seem inconceivable
that anyone would question the use of the Internet to deliver government
information or to facilitate communication with the government. 247
If Crawford had been decided in 1908 Indiana, the decision would likewise
seem impossible of any resolution other than unconstitutionality due to both the
cost of a photographic ID and the significantly greater inconvenience of traveling
to obtain it in a pre-Interstate Highway, pre-mass transit, pre-mass ownership of
the automobile society.
C. Interim Mitigation ofDisparate Impact

Justice Breyer's Crawford dissent acknowledged that the government can
mitigate the burdens it has imposed. 248 Indeed, "[t]he travel burdens might, in the
future, be reduced to some extent by Indiana's commendable 'DMV2You' mobile
license branch, which will travel across the State for an average of three days a
week, and provide BMV services (including ID services)."249 Presumably, such
mitigation could have moved the dissent to join Justice Stevens's opinion to tum
the plurality into a majority.

245. See FCC INTERNET REPORT, supra note 18, at 4.
246. See U.S. Census Bureau Press Release, supra note 19, at 3. Overall, 51% of Americans
have Internet access at home, in contrast to only 29% of people with a severe disability. Jd. This
same group has median earnings of$12,800 as compared with the national average of$25,000. Jd.
247. See Developments in the Law-Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1144, 1153
(2006) (arguing that "the constitutional viability of photographic identification provisions might well
increase in the future, both as states improve election administration and as voters and election
officials grow more aware of their respective responsibilities, thus ... diminishing the burden of
photographic identification requirements").
248. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1644--45 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
249. Jd. at 1630 n.l4 (plurality opinion).

2009]

Does Technological Progress Threaten Electoral Equality?

1069

In addition, both the Breyer dissent in Crawforcf5° and the development of the
Georgia photo ID litigation251 indicate the role that education can play in
transforming an unconstitutional burden into an acceptable "ordinary and
widespread" burden. 252
In the context of voter ID requirements, one commentator, Samuel P. Langholz,
suggested the following:
To craft the requirement into one that can pass constitutional scrutiny,
three key areas of change are likely necessary. First, the state must
ensure that the requisite photo identification is available at no cost to all
eligible voters. Second, the state should consider proactively educating
voters about the requirement and developing a program to help ensure
that all eligible voters obtain identification. Third, the state might
consider creating a safety-valve by exempting some classes of voters
from the requirement to ease the burden on those for whom it is
heaviest. 253
Translating these voter ID recommendations into the Internet-mediated
government-citizen interaction model, the first requirement is already met and
will continue to be met, provided that no tax or other burden is imposed on access
to the Internet. The second requirement might be met by improving Internet
access through public libraries (or government buildings), or by creating a
program similar to Indiana's DMV2You vans. Further, education on how to use
250. !d. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[M]any of these individuals may be uncertain about
how to obtain the underlying documentation .... And some may find the costs associated with these
documents unduly burdensome (up to $12 for a copy of a birth certificate; up to$ 100 fora passport).
By way of comparison, this Court previously found unconstitutionally burdensome a poll tax of$1.50
(less than $10 today, inflation-adjusted).").
251. Compare Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups II), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1346 (N.D. Ga.
2006) ("PPSA 's [Paid Public Service Announcements] began running only two weeks before the July
18, 2006, primary elections."), with Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups III), 504 F. Supp. 2d
1333, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2007), vacated, 554 F.3d 1340 (II th Cir. 2009) ("Here, however, the State has
undertaken a serious, concerted effort to notify voters who may lack Photo ID cards ....").
252. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Ordinary and widespread burdens,
such as those requiring 'nominal effort' of everyone, are not severe.").
253. Langholz, supra note 144, at 788 (citations omitted); see also Montgomery, supra note 158,
at 674. Montgomery notes, however, that
[t]his is not to say that imposing a Photo 1D requirement will always have the effect of
imposing an undue burden on the right to vote, or that requiring such identification as a
prerequisite of having one's vote counted will always result in an unsatisfactory balance
between the values of access and integrity. It simply means that legislatures need to ensure
that, in implementing these requirements, certain classes of voters are not left effectively
disenfranchised. In Missouri's case, this might mean a long phase-in period may be
required during which forms of identification other than Photo 1D are accepted. A longer
phase-in would give time for the "mobile processing system" included in SB I 014 to reach
elderly and disabled voters, and would give all voters more time to obtain a Photo 1D and
comply with the identification requirements, reducing the burden imposed on voters by the
Photo ID requirement.
!d.
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the Internet in general and how to use it to communicate with the government in
particular would also be a mitigating factor.
The "safety valve" factor might be met by continuing to offer services through
traditional means in parallel to the Internet and by carefully considering the
possibility of, and taking steps to avoid, unintended preferences to Internet users.
In deciding the degree to which the government must take special steps to
accommodate users, the spectrum of government uses 254 should be considered.
For example, less government accommodation should be required for highlyregulated profit-motivated activities than for individual entitlements? 55 Similarly,
the government should be entitled to assume Internet competence in areas
otherwise requiring technological sophistication. 256 Adding Internet delivery of
services to traditional methods is unobjectionable. For the great majority of
citizens, however, the government needs to proceed with caution. In doing so, it
should replace current forms of delivery of services only after assuring
widespread access to the Internet, both in terms of physical access to the tool and
the education necessary to make effective use ofthe tool.

254. See supra Part V.A.
255. For example, there should be a decreased need for special treatment of a large, well-funded,
profit-motivated pharmaceutical company filing an application with the Food and Drug
Administration than for an individual applying for a driver's license or unemployment benefits or
registering to vote.
256. A potential example is an application for a permit to construct a nuclear power plant or a
hazardous waste landfill, where the activity itself requires technological sophistication of a level that
would also imply familiarity with computers and the Internet.

